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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
SUPER TIRE MARKE!', INC., ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. CASE 
CLYDE ROLLINS, d.b.a ( NO. 10,581 
ROLLINS MINE SUPPLY, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This action was brought on an open account for tires 
sold, with a defense interposed of a right to setoff for 
breach of warranty of mileage to be received from such 
tires. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER OOUBT 
The trial court granted plaintiff-respondent judgment 
upon the claim asserted in the complaint, without set-off. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant requests reversal with order to 
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that there is no evi-
dence whatsoever to supi;x>rt the finding of the trial court 
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that there was no warranty given by respondent in con-
nection with, the sale of the tires, or damages for breach 
of that warranty, that substantial believable, competent, 
evidence shows a breach of an express warranty, and dam-
ages for that breach exceed the sum claimed by resPond-
ent. 
STATEMENT OF FAcn 
Appellant, doing btisine8s as Rollins Mine Supply, op-
erates five l~ diesel tractor trucks on the highway be-
tween PrO\f9, Utah, and Carbon County, each truck Uiu-
ally making two trips per day (R. 102). Tires for these 
trucks constitute a major operating expense (R. 67, 102). 
From 1lhe time he began purchases from respondent until 
the facts developed out of which this dispute arose, appel-
lant purchased approximately one hundred tires from re-
spondent (R. 68, 103). 
~bout the middle of 1962, appellant began complain-
ing to Mr. Jack Jensen, ~esman f~ respondent, that the 
tires he had purchased were not giving adequate mileage 
(ft.. 89, 90). In response to these objections,· Mr. Jensen, 
ort beNtlr of respondent, gave appellant an oral warranty 
that the brand known as "Motrack" would give 75,000 
miles wear, and the brand known as "Mighty Mo's" would 
give 100,000 miles wear, or respondent would re-cap them 
(R. 8.1, 83, 90, 1G4-5). Mr. Mike Billus, 1)Ile of the oWners 
of respondent, (R. 156) instructed Mr. Jensen to make the 
warranty (R. 85). The only representative of respondent 
with which appellant dealt prior to the dispute on which 
thiS actioo is rounded, was Mr. Jensen (R. 139). The au-
th0rity of Mr. Ju1sen to speak for respondent was not ques-
timed at the trial. 
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Subsequently, in early 1963, respondent refused to 
honor the warranty as to mileage for thirty-two of the 
tires which had given less than 50% of the mileage war-
ranted, and appellant thereupon refused to pay the balance 
owing upon the open Cl!CCOunt (R. 109-112). This action 
was brought to recover on that open account. Appellant's 
defense is a set-off for breach of an express warranty, the 
set-off exceeding the amount of the claim. 
The theory of appellant's defense is that there was a 
breach of an express warranty as that term is defined in 
Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, Section 60-1-12, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. (It is remembered that this case 
arose and was tried prior to the effective date of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.) 
Over objection, the trial court permitted a Mr. Ken 
Stika to testify that as long as he had worked a:t the Provo 
store, there had not been to his knowledge any waITanty 
on the brand of tire known as "Motrack", that there had 
been a 100,000 mile warranty on the brand known as 
"Mighty Mo", that this warranty 'had been discontinued, 
but he did not know when with respect to the sales to ap-
pellant (R. 152-4). He had nothing to do with the tran-
sactions between appellant and respondent and made no 
sales to appellant (R. 153); Mr. Jensen did not work under 
Mr. Stika and Mr. Stika had no supervisory position over 
Mr. Jensen ( R. 155-6) ; Mr. Stika did not know whether 
Mr. Billus, an owner of respondent, and Mr. Jensen had 
any conversations conceming warranting mileage to ap-
pellant (R. 156); and he knew nothing as to what went on 
between management, other salesmen, and their custo-
mers (R. 156). 
It is our position that Mr. Stika's testimony in rebuttal 
on the trial was inadmissible. and in any event it had no 
bearing on the question of the making of an express war-
ranty to appellant. 
On that record, the trial court (in one of the two sets 
of findings of fact signed and entered by it), found that 
there was no warranty as claimed by appellant, and en-
tered judgment (again in two of three judgments entered 
by it) for respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRI· 
AL COURTS FINDING OF FACT ON THE ISSUE OF 
BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
In the second set, chronologically, of findings of fact 
and conclusions of law signed and entered by the trial 
court is the following finding: 
"3. That on tires purchased during the above 
stated period (the time when appellant pur· 
chased from respondent) the tires were not 
covered by any tYPe of waran.ty (sic) by 
Plaintiff." (R. 29) 
Our position is that there is simply nothing in the rec-
ord to support that finding. 
We are cognizant of the rule as stated in Lowe v. Ro-
sealoff, 12 Utah 2d, 190, 364 P 2d 418: 
"This court has stated on numerous occasions that 
findings of fact made by the trial court will not be 
disturbed so long as they are supported by substan· 
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tial evidence. Therefore, the findings of the lower 
court must be affirmed unless there was no reasonable 
basis in the evidence on which rtlhe court could fairly 
and rationally have thought the requisite proof was 
met." 
The cases we have found applying this rule generally 
affirm the trial court in its finding based upon conflicting 
evidence, sometimes observing, in passing, that the rule 
applies. though the appellate court may be inclined to be-
lieve that testimony which conflicts with the facts as found 
by the trial court. 
In the case before this court there is no conflict in the 
evidence. The record does not show a dispute of fact. 
Counsel for respondent, on argUrnent before the trial 
court, belabored Mr. Stika's testimony. OW' reSponse is 
(1) that it was inadmissible and objected to, and (2) it 
does not raiSe any conflict as regards the evidence sup-
porting appellant's position that he was given an express 
warranty that he would receive a guaranteed mileage from 
tires sold. 
It is remembered that Mr. Stika was merely another 
employee of respondent, that he had nothing to do with 
the sales to appellant or any business arrangement or tran-
saction between respondent and appellant, that he lmew 
nothing of possible arrangements or conversations between 
Mr. Jensen, respondent's salesman, and either respondent 
or appellant, and that he and Mr. Jensen had no business 
connections other than a common employer (R. 153-6). 
His testimony would have no bearing at all on the ques-
tion whether, at a specfic time, and with express authority 
from respondent, through one of its owners, Mr. Jensen 
gave appellant an express warranty, or "guaranty", that 
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appellant would receive a minimum mileage per tire, at 
no cost over the purchase price. The record is replete and 
uncontradicted, showing this latter statement to be the 
fact (R. 80-87, 88, 90, 104-5). 
It is of note, also, that when appellant, after this dis-
pute arose, discussed settlement of the account with Mr. 
Stika and also with Mr. Billus, an owner of respondent, 
neither denied the warranty (R. 117, 119, 70). 
POINT Il 
RESPONDENT'S AGENT HAD ACfUAL OR AP-
PARENT AUTHORITY TO WARRANT. 
No evidence was offered to challenge Mr. Jensen's au-
thority as agent for respondent to warrant mileage appel-
lant should obtain from tires it sold to him. We therefore 
believe this question may not be raised on appeal. How-
ever, counsel for respondent argued this before the trial 
court, and we anticipate him here on the merits. 
The subject of implied or apparent authority of an 
agent selling personal property to make warranties is thor-
oughly treated by this court in Park v. lUoorman Mfg. Co., 
121 Utah 339, 241 P 2d 914, 40 A. L. R. 2d 273. See also 
2 Williston on Sales (Rev. Ed.) 660-664, Sec. 445 and Sec. 
445b. 
We are not here concerned, as this court was con-
cerned in the case of Park v. Moorman, supra, with an im-
plied authority to warrant mileage to be given by the tires 
sold. On cross examination Mr. Jensen testified: 
"Q. Why did the one have 100,000 miles guaranty 
and these 75,000 miles guaranty? 
A. Because! Mike Billus (an owner of respond· 
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ent, see R. 156) gave me instructions to give that 
warranty. 
Q. When? 
A. When the tires were sold, before they were 
sold. 
Q. When did Mike Billus tell you this? 
A. Just before I sold them, over the telephone." 
(R. 85). 
It is our position respondent's agent had express au-
thority to warrant mileage of tires sold appellant. He was 
the only agent of respondent to deal with appellant. Had 
Mr. Gill or Mr. Billus, owners of the respondent at the time 
complained of and at the time of the trial CR. 156), or any· 
one on their authority disputed this evidence, we would 
not be on appeal. As with the evidence on the warranty, 
the evidence on Mr: Jensen's authority to give it is tm-
disputed. 
POINT ID 
APPELLANT'S DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WA&-
RA.""ITY EXCEED RESPONDENT'S CLAIM. 
Appellant computed the amount he claims as set-off 
by taking from the purchase price the same peircmtage 
thereof as the actual miles obtained from each brand of 
tires sold bore to the total mileage warranted in eaeh case 
(R. 11-156). The theory was that the amount thus left 
I'epresented the value of the mileage not delivered. This 
amount is $1,431.60. The difference between this amount 
and that of respondent's claim appeared, to appellant at 
least, as oominal, and he as.c;erted his right by way of a 
Plea in abatement rather than by way of counterdtim. 
This, we submit, he had a right to do. 
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Section 60-5-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, proVides: 
"(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the sel-
ler, the buyer may, at his election: 
(a) Accept or keep the goods, and set up against 
the seller the breach of warranty by way of recoup. 
ment in dimunition or extinction of the price; 
(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintan an 
action against the seller for damages for the breach 
of warranty; 
(7) In the case of breach of warranty of qual-
ty, such loss, . . . is the difference between the value 
of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and 
the value they would have had if they had answered 
to the warranty." 
Appellant received forty-five percent orf the mileage 
warranted (R. 126). He ought not to be required to pay 
for one hundred percent of the merehandise as warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The post trial proceedings in this case are of interest. 
On January 21, 1965, the court signed and entered a judg-
~~nt for respondent, unsupported by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (R. 19). On February 24, 1965, the 
court apparently signed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, finding the warranty was given, and signed and 
entered a judgment of no cause of action (R. 26-8). On 
March 1, 1965, the court signed and entered findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, finding no warranty and con· 
eluding respondent was entitled to judgment (R. 29-30), 
and on Maoch 23, 1965, he signed and entered a judgment 
pursuant thereto ( R. 33) . 
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This appears irresolute; a careful analysis of the judg-
ment roll, including minute entries, would disclose its basis. 
The significance of this here is its disclosure of the 
Jack of attention given this case by the trial court. 
The record presents no evidence refuting appellant's 
position that he was given an express warranty as to qual-
ity of the tires sold him by one with authority so to do, 
and that he received a product not possessing this quality. 
If this court will affirm a finding where there is some com-
petent evidence to support it, then we believe it should re-
verse a finding of fact when made in the face of compe-
tent, admissible, substantial and unrefuted evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
